FluentCrypto: Cryptography in Easy Mode: Conclusion and References

Table of Links

• Abstract and I. Introduction
• II. Related Work
• III. Background and Motivation
• IV. FluentCrypto
• V. Study Setup
• VI. Study Result
• VII. Threats to Validity
• VIII. Conclusion and References

VIII. CONCLUSION

We developed FluentCrypto to relieve mainstream developers from dealing with low-level cryptography complexities. It is built on top of the standard Node.js API and provides a task-based solution i.e., developers only state “what” they need rather than being concerned about “how” to implement a cryptography task. We also developed a domain-specific language, called CryRule, that crypto experts can use to specify constraints on crypto objects. FluentCrypto relies on these constraints to determine a secure configuration of the API. Through an initial study, we found that FluentCrypto greatly helps developers to deliver secure solutions in a shorter time. It prevents common errors by novice developers, but at the same time it still allows experienced developers to access advanced settings.

This work is the first step toward supporting mainstream developers with a crypto API that is secure by design, and further studies are essential to claim any generalization. We plan to conduct an extensive experiment with more subjects when COVID-19 restrictions relax and developers come back to their work offices. Particularly, we are interested to assess the usability of FluentCrypto in depth as well as its runtime overhead. In terms of extending FluentCrypto, we will investigate whether its current design would support other cryptography tasks as well. Besides, in this work we relied on a dynamic approach to enforce crypto constraints mainly due to the use of JavaScript, but it is worthwhile to investigate the possibility of adopting statical techniques to provide developers with JIT feedback especially in other settings.

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